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Recent Developments
ALIEN CHECKPOINTS AND THE TROUBLESOME
TETRALOGY: UNITED STATES v.
MARTINEZ-FUERTE
INTRODUCTION
In a 7 to 2 decision,' the Supreme Court has ruled Border Patrol
agents may stop vehicles at fixed checkpoints and briefly question
the occupants even though no reason exists to believe the vehicle
contains unlawfully entered aliens.2 The Court also held that a ju-
dicial warrant is unnecessary to operate a checkpoint. In resolving
a split among the courts of appeals,4 the Supreme Court has com-
pleted a significant phase of search and seizure law which began
with the seminal case of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States.5
1. Mr. Justice Powell wrote the opinion for the majority. Mr. Justice
Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Marshall con-
curred.
2. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct 3074 (1976). The case was
decided together with Sifuentes v. United States, id. All references to
parties and their briefs are to the principal case only.
3. 96 S. Ct. at 3086.
4. Compare United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir.
1975) (routine checkpoint operations unconstitutional), with United States
v. Santibanez, 517 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1975), and United States v. Bowman,
487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973) (routine checkpoint operations constitu-
tional).
5. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). For a detailed discussion of procedural strate-
gies arguably available in deportation hearings when an alien has been il-
legally arrested, see Fragomen, Procedural Aspects of Illegal Search and
Seizure in Deportation Cases, 14 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 151 (1976).
Almeida-Sanchez held that Border Patrol officers on roving pa-
trol may not search vehicles without consent or traditional probable
cause. 6 In United States v. Ortiz,7 the Supreme Court extended this
holding to searches at fixed checkpoints. The same day Ortiz was
decided,8 the Court ruled on the constitutionality of a law enforce-
ment practice less intrusive than a search-a brief stop and inquiry
about the detainee's citizenship. That case, United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce,9 held that Border Patrol officers on roving patrol may
stop vehicles and question the occupants only if the officers have
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains aliens unlawfully
present.10 In Martinez-Fuerte, which involved traffic checking
procedures at the San Clemente, California, checkpoint, the Su-
preme Court refused to require that investigative stops and inquir-
ies be based on reasonable suspicion.1"
One difficulty with Martinez-Fuerte is its inconsistency with pre-
vious rulings. The dissenting Justices declared the holding could
not be reconciled with Aimeida-Sanchez, Ortiz, and Brignoni-
Ponce.12 However, the majority accepted the Government's conten-
tion that checkpoint stops13 are significantly different from roving
6. 413 U.S. at 273. The case was the subject of much discussion in the pe-
riodicals. E.g., Note, Almeida-Sanchez and Its Progeny: The Developing
Border Zone Search Law, 17 Aiz. L. Rnv. 214 (1975); Note, Area Search
Warrants in Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara, 84 YALE L.J. 355
(1974).
7. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
8. The decision was handed down on June 30, 1975, the last day of the
Supreme Court's term. Similarly, Martinez-Fuerte was announced on the
final day of this year's term, July 6, 1976.
9. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
10. Id. at 884. Reasonable suspicion requires a quantum of suspicion less
than that of probable cause. It is based on "specific articulable facts, to-
gether with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant
suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the coun-
try." Id. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
11. 96 S. Ct. at 3084 (1976).
12. Id. at 3088 (dissenting opinion).
13. Routine procedures at the San Clemente checkpoint are twofold. All
traffic is funnelled into two lanes and brought to a stop at the checkpoint
through the use of flashing red lights and signs. A "point" officer, stationed
between the two lines of traffic, surveys each vehicle and either waves it
through or refers it to a secondary inspection area off the highway where
other officers make further visual inspection and question the occupants
about their citizenship. The average length of this secondary inspection is
three to five minutes. Only a small percentage of vehicles are referred to
the secondary area. Id. at 3077.
Routine operations in Sifuentes involved the checkpoint near Sarita,
Texas. The checkpoint i& located on U.S. Highway 77, more than sixty-
five miles from the border. Traffic checking procedures differ from those
at San Clemente in that all passing motorists, except for recognized local
inhabitants, are stopped for brief inquiry. Id. at 3079.
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patrol stops in the two aspects which control the reasonableness
balance: With the former, the law enforcement need is greater, and
the intrusion on fourth amendment 14 interests is lesser.15
The thesis of this Comment is that the foregoing contention can-
not withstand careful examination. The Government's need to con-
duct routine checkpoint operations is no greater than its need to
conduct roving patrol operations. With the former, the intrusion on
fourth amendment rights is as onerous, and the overall burden on
lawful traffic is more considerable. In addition, the Court made
several questionable factual assumptions and altered the traditional
allocation of the burden of proof with respect to warrantless law en-
forcement conduct. This Comment will summarize the factual con-
text of the case, examine the Ninth Circuit's holding, which the Su-
preme Court reversed, and analyze the Supreme Court's decision.
THE ILLEGAL IMzMGRATioN PROBLEM
Scope of the Problem
The current annual quota for foreign immigrants is 290,000-
120,000 of which are allocated for Western Hemisphere countries, in-
cluding Mexico.' 6 The Immigration and Naturalization Service has
estimated that 250,000 immigrants enter unlawfully every year.'
7
The number of undocumented aliens currently residing in this
country has been estimated to be as high as 12 million,'8 but is now
placed by the Service at 8.2 million.' 9 Between 65 and 85 percent
14. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV reads:
The right to the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
15. Brief for Petitioner at 17, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct.
3074 (1976).
16. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a) (27) & 1151(a) (1970). See also Jensen, U.S.
Economy Eroded By "Silent Invasion," San Diego Union, June 28, 1976, §
A, at 1, col. 1.
For a thorough discussion of the procedure for obtaining an immigrant
visa, see Comment, How to Immigrate to the United States: A Practical
Guide for the Attorney, 14 SAx DiEGo L. Rav. 193 (1976).
17. Jensen, supra note 16. As recently as 190, the figure was 40,000.
Id.
18. United States v. Martinez-Fuert% 96 S. Ct. at 3079.
19. Jensen, supra note 16.
are from Mexico.2°
In fiscal 1975 Service officers located 766,600 deportable aliens.21
Of these, 680,392 were Mexican; 22 667,689 of the deportable aliens
entered the country by crossing the border surreptitiously. Ninety-
nine percent of these entries were made across the 2,000 mile-long
Mexican border.23 Once inside the country, undocumented aliens
seek to travel inland to labor market areas, often employing the
services of professional smugglers. 24 Opinions differ sharply about
whether these aliens' enjoyment of public services and eventual em-
ployment within the United States adversely affect the economy.
25
Primary responsibility for prevention of illegal entry and appre-
hension of illegal entrants falls on the service branch known as the
United States Border Patrol. Formed in 1924, the Border Patrol is
comprised of 1700 officers, 80 percent of whom are assigned to the
Mexican-American border area.26 The Border Patrol has two basic
functions: preventing illegal entry by a linewatch and detecting
aliens by traffic checking and other inland operations.
27
The Border Linewatch
Although common sense dictates that the best place to concen-
trate enforcement efforts is at the border itself, the Government
and the Supreme Court have concluded that stopping the influx of
20. Compare id., with United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. at 3080.
21. 1975 INS, ANNUAL RaPORT 13. This number represented a slight de-
crease from the 788,145 aliens located in 1974, the first such decrease in more
than ten years. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. at 3080.
25. E.g., one study done by a private consulting firm in Washing-
ton, D.C., estimated that undocumented aliens cost at least $13 billion
annually in public services and in lost wages, unemployment, and wel-
fare benefits for American citizens who would otherwise be employed. Jen-
sen, supra note 16. In contrast are the results of a Department of Labor
Study released November 19, 1975, which concluded that: "The involve-
ment of illegals in taxpaying is much more pronounced than their use of
tax-supported systems." The study indicated that 77 percent of the undocu-
mented aliens sampled pay social security taxes, and 73 percent pay federal
income taxes. In addition, only 0.5 percent received welfare benefits; 1.3
percent received food stamps; 3.9 percent received one or more weeks of
unemployment benefits, and 7.6 percent were parents with children in pub-
lic schools. Forty-four percent made hospitalization payments, while 27.4
percent used federal hospitals or clinics. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 21, 1975,
pt. I, at 8, col. 2.
26. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 906 (1975).
27. See id.
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undocumented aliens at the border is impossible.28  The Court
stated in Brignoni-Ponce:
The Mexican border is almost 2,000 miles long, and even a vastly
reinforced Border Patrol would find it impossible to prevent illegal
border crossings. Many aliens cross the Mexican border on foot,
miles away from patrolled areas, and then purchase transportation
from the border area to inland cities, where they find jobs and
elude the immigration authorities.
29
Even though the Border Patrol maintains electronic sensors,30
fences, and personnel along the border, "it remains relatively easy
for individuals to enter the United States without detection."
31
Inland Checkpoints
The Border Patrol's inland traffic checking operations consist of
roving patrols and fixed checkpoints of a permanent or temporary
nature.32  There are seventeen permanent and thirty temporary
checkpoints located in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Tex-
as.33 The Government states checkpoint operations have
always been the single most important element of the enforcement
plan, in terms both of apprehending illegal entrants and of deter-
ring unauthorized entry .... [A]lthough roving patrol operations
have historically been an important part of the Border Patrol's traf-
fic checking program, they have always been essentially supple-
mentary to the checkpoints themselves which are the heart of the
enforcement effort. 34
28. Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S.
Ct. 3074 (1976).
29. 422 U.S. at 879.
30. The Border Patrol also utilizes "Chekar" devices in areas both near
to and removed from the immediate border. These devices are imbedded
underground in highways and send out a signal when a vehicle or any large
mass of metal passes over it. United States v. Shields, 534 F.2d 605, 606 n.1
(5th Cir. 1976). In Shields, Border Patrol officers stopped a car which had
tripped a Chekar implanted near Hebronville, Texas, more than sixty-five
miles from the Mexican border. The court held the stop was unconstitu-
tional because there was no reasonable suspicion to believe the car con-
tained undocumented aliens. Id. at 608.
31. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. at 3080.
32. Id. The statutory authority for traffic checking operations is con-
ferred by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357 (a) (1) & (a) (3) (1970). Under current regula-
tions the authority conferred by § 1357(a) (3) may be exercised within 100
miles of the border. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (a) (2) (1976).
33. These fall within the jurisdiction of six different federal judicial dis-
tricts. Brief for Petitioner at 39, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S.
Ct. 3074 (1976).
34. Id. at 19-20.
Traffic checkpoints are located on major and minor highways
leading away from the border. The Government contends the
checkpoints must be operated more than twenty-five miles from the
border because many illegal aliens abuse the use of border passes
authorizing travel within twenty-five miles of the border during a
seventy-two hour period.35 Other factors affecting location are the
terrain surrounding the highway, concentration of traffic, conflu-
ence of roads leading away from the border, and safety of conduct-
ing a traffic slowdown.
36
The San Clemente checkpoint is the primary checkpoint in south-
ern California,37 and the busiest of all the Service's checkpoints.
Approximately 10 million cars pass through the checkpoint annual-
ly.38 Although traffic along Interstate 5 is said to be lightest at the
location of the checkpoint, 9 the checkpoint is forced to close down
during peak traffic hours.40 The surrounding geography was an ad-
ditional determinant of the checkpoint's location because of the dif-
ficulty in traveling around it. The presence of Camp Pendleton
Marine Corps Base on the east and the Pacific Ocean on the west
marked the area as "a natural corridor along which illegal aliens
frequently travel in their migration towards the labor markets in
the north."41 The distance from the border, sixty-six road miles,
ensures that unlawful entrants cannot use border passes, but also
dictates that most motorists passing through are lawfully within
the country.
THE NINTH CIRcuiT's HOLDING
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit held that Border Patrol offi-
cers, absent a valid warrant, must have founded suspicion in order
to stop a vehicle at a checkpoint.42 The court considered this to be
35. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. at 3080. Nonimmigrant
visitors may obtain these cards by filling out form 1-186. 8 C.F.R. § 212.6
(1976). In addition, certain classes of aliens may obtain Registration Re-
ceipt Cards (green cards), form 1-151, to be used in lieu of immigrant visas.
Id. § 211.1(b).
36. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. at 3080.
37. The checkpoint is actually located at San Onofre, five miles south
of San Clemente. It is on Interstate 5, the major highway connecting Call-
fornia's two largest cities, San Diego and Los Angeles. It is located sixty-
six road miles north of the border. Id. at 3077.
38. Id. at 3081.
39. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 415 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
40. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct.,at 3081 n.10. Because of
this factor and of occasional bad weather and manpower shortages, the
checkpoint is operable only about 70 percent of the time. Id. at 3081.
41. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 415 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
42. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308, 315 (9th Cir. 1975).
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"the logical, and predictable, next step in the development of search
and seizure doctrine under Almeida-Sanchez v. United States
.... "43 The court began by examining the intrusion on fourth
amendment interests created by checkpoint stops. It noted that
even a fleeting stop was subject to fourth amendment protection
and that the minimal requirement for stopping a vehicle within the
jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit had long been founded suspicion."
The court discerned no substantial distinction between a stop of a
vehicle at a checkpoint and a roving stop.
45
The majority rejected the Government's argument that check-
point operations were necessary for successful enforcement of the
immigration laws. 6 Applying the doctrine of less onerous alterna-
tives, the majority stated "given the present border patrol man-
power, there are simply two [sic] few fingers to plug the many
leaks in the dike . ... 47 Additional alternatives noted by the
court were eliminating the green card and border pass programs
and inducing Congress to impose sanctions on employers who hire
undocumented aliens.
48
The court had previously held routine stops at San Clemente require a
founded suspicion. United States v. Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir.
1974). The Government then obtained a "warrant of inspection" to operate
the checkpoint during the summer of 1974. The Martinez-Fuerte court de-
voted much of its opinion to the issue of whether "the warrant of inspection
somehow transforms otherwise unreasonable seizures into constitutional
ones." 514 F.2d at 315. The court noted the supporting affidavits contained
no particularized facts about individual vehicles and that the warrant did
not interpose the mediating judgment of a magistrate, for it authorized the
stopping of vehicles and detention of motorists solely at the discretion of
the Border Patrol officers. The court concluded the warrant could not be
justified under established fourth amendment principles. Id. at 315-16.
43. 514 F.2d at 314.
44. United States v. Jaime-Barrios, 494 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Ward, 488 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bugarin-Casas,
484 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1973); Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966).
No substantial difference exists between the requirements of founded suspi-
cion and reasonable suspicion. United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476,
477 (9th Cir. 1975).
45. Indeed, the court did not specifically deal with the contention that
checkpoint stops are less intrusive so as to require less protection under
the fourth amendment. The court stated simply that investigative check-
point stops involved "precisely the unconstitutional conduct" it had con-
demned in cases dealing with checkpoint searches and roving patrol stops.
514 F.2d at 315.
46. Id. at 318.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 319.
More significant than the court's rejection of the Government's
necessity argument was its suggestion that even if routine check-
point operations were necessary to apprehend undocumented aliens,
they would not be constitutional. The court rejected the notion
that "somehow the asserted need to conduct such immigration sei-
zures and searches establishes adequate cause to disrupt the normal
flow of traffic on a major highway.
49
The Ninth Circuit's decision differs from that of the Supreme
Court in four ways. First, the lower court found no constitutional
difference between the seizure occasioned by an investigative check-
point stop and that occasioned by a roving stop. Second, the court
was not persuaded by the Government's argument that routine
checkpoint operations were necessary to enforce the immigration
laws. Third, the court found the rate of undocumented alien appre-
hension at the checkpoint to be miniscule in comparison with the
volume of legitimate traffic which passes through the checkpoint.
The court noted that of 145,960 vehicles which passed through the
checkpoint during an eight-day period, 820 were referred to the sec-
ondary inspection area. Of these, 171 contained undocumented ali-
ens. Thus only .12 percent of the vehicles passing through were
found to contain undocumented aliens,"
Finally, and most significantly, the Ninth Circuit employed an en-
tirely different mode of constitutional adjudication. The core of its
inquiry was the intrusion on fourth amendment rights caused by
checkpoint seizures. The court did not employ a balancing test un-
der which the asserted government need is initially viewed in parity
with the protected private interests. Rather, the court implied that
consideration of the argument of law enforcement need was beyond
the scope of judicial review.' 1 As authority for this approach the
Ninth Circuit quoted the Supreme Court, which had stated in Al-
meida-Sanchez:
It is not enough to argue, as does the Government, that the problem
of deterring unlawful entry by aliens across long expanses of na-
tional boundaries is a serious one. The needs of law enforcement
49. Id. at 318. The court stated "the mere fact that protecting a constitu-
tional right will impose a heavy burden on the federal fise is not a proper
ground for our failure to protect that right." Id. at 318-19. After this deci-
sion, the Border Patrol abandoned most of its checkpoint operations in Cali-
fornia and Arizona. Brief for Petitioner at 24-25, United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
50. 514 F.2d at 313-14.
51. The court asserted: "It is not our business to tell the executive how
to enforce the laws, nor to tell the Congress what laws to enact." Id. at
3.18.
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stand in constant tension with the Constitution's protections of the
individual against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely
the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty
to constitutional safeguards.52
THE Suprmim CouRT's HOLDING
Summary of the Opinion
The Supreme Court's holding was limited to permanent traffic
checkpoints. 5 The Court held that Border Patrol officers may stop
all vehicles on the highway even without any measure of suspicion
that a particular vehicle contains undocumented aliens.54 The
Court also held that officers may selectively refer vehicles to a sec-
ondary area for further visual inspection and for questioning about
citizenship, again in the absence of any quantum of suspicion.56 The
Court restricted this random investigative conduct to the stop and
brief detention of a vehicle for questioning of the occupants, stating
that a search or any further detention of the vehicle and its passen-
gers must be based either on consent or on probable cause.56
The Court conceded that checkpoint stops are "seizures" within
the meaning of the fourth amendment.57 However, it found the in-
terference with fourth amendment interests "quite limited" and
outweighed by the "great" law enforcement need to make check-
point stops.58 The Court concluded that the overall degree of inter-
ference with legitimate traffic was less than that caused by random
roving patrol stops. 9 Finally, the majority held the warrant re-
quirement of the fourth amendment inapplicable because check-
points display visible manifestations of the field officer's legitimate
authority and because the decision to "seize" is not entirely in the
field officers' hands but rather is shared by higher ranking offi-
cials.60
Critical Analysis and Evaluation
The Supreme Court's decision is based on nine distinct proposi-
52. Id., citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
53. 96 S. Ct. at 3080.
54. Id. at 3084.
55. Id. at 3085.
56. Id. at 3087.
57. Id. at 3082.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 3083.
60. Id. at 3086.
tions. Five are factual, and four are theories of law. These will be
discussed separately, beginning with the factual propositions.
The Necessity of Checkpoint Operations
The core of the Government's argument, and a recurrent theme
throughout the opinion, is the law enforcement need to apprehend
undocumented aliens enroute to labor market areas in the interior.
The contention that checkpoint operations are necessary to fur-
ther this need is based on two sub-propositions: Checkpoint opera-
tions are an effective means of apprehending undocumented aliens
and deterring unlawful entry, and no reasonable, less intrusive al-
ternatives exist.
Effectiveness of Checkpoint Operations
In general, the Government's claim that checkpoint operations
impose an "effective obstacle""' and deter unlawful entry cannot be
substantiated by the facts.6 2 The number of undocumented aliens
in the country and the present rate of unlawful entry belie these
claims. 68  The statistics cited by the Court do not complete the pic-
ture. For example, the Court noted that over 17,000 were appre-
hended at the San Clemente checkpoint in 1973,64 but failed to men-
tion that approximately 320,000 traverse Interstate 5 each year. 5
Thus only about 5 percent of the undocumented aliens passing
through the checkpoint are apprehended.06
Part of the problem is the conceded inability of the Border Patrol
to operate the checkpoints on a full-time basis.67 Thus in addition
to the vast numbers who slip through undetected, many undocu-
mented aliens, by chance or device, pass the checkpoint while it is
inoperative. The Court's conclusion that in the absence of check-
point operations the highways "would offer illegal aliens a quick
and safe route into the interior"66 is rendered hollow by the fact
that with checkpoints in operation the same holds true for 95 per-
cent of the traveling aliens.
61. Brief for Petitioner at 20, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct.
3074 (1976).
62. See Brief for Respondents at 34-36, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
63. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
64. 96 S. Ct. at 3081.
65. Brief for Respondents at 36 n.18, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
66. Id.
67. See note 40 supra.
68. 96 S. Ct. at 3082.
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Alternatives to Checkpoints
The Supreme Court noted that 55,300 deportable aliens were ap-
prehended in fiscal 1973 through traffic checking operations.69 That
number, however, represents a mere 8 percent of the total number
of deportable aliens apprehended during that year. More than
600,000 deportable aliens were apprehended by enforcement opera-
tions other than traffic checking programs.70 To support the argu-
ment that checkpoints are necessary is at best difficult.
The Court said: "Our previous cases have recognized that main-
tenance of a traffic checking program in the interior is necessary be-
cause the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively at
the border."71 It is also true, however, that the internal flow of un-
documented aliens cannot be controlled effectively by traffic check-
points. Moreover, in fiscal 1973 the number of unlawful entrants
apprehended at the border was more than three times the number
located by traffic-checking programs. 7 2 Thus the converse of the
Court's statement is better supported by the facts: Maintenance of
the linewatch operations is necessary because the inland migration
of unlawful entrants cannot be controlled.
This realization leads to two important observations. First, it ap-
pears a decision affirming the Ninth Circuit and precluding routine
checkpoint operations would have forced the Border Patrol into a
more effective allocation of its manpower. Current manpower al-
lotments support this assumption. For example, during a typical
day shift in California, only thirty officers are devoted to patrolling
the entire California-Mexican border.7 3 This number could be sup-
plemented by the forty-seven officers employed for a twenty-four
hour operation of the San Clemente checkpoint alone.74 Thus a
shutdown of the checkpoints would permit greater concentration of
69. Id. at 3080.
70. Brief for Respondents at 35 n.17, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). Because the 8 percent figure includes all traffic
checking operations, the percentage of the total apprehended at checkpoints
is even smaller. Id.
71. 96 S. Ct. at 3082.
72. 175,511 aliens were apprehended at the border. Id. at 3080.
73. Brief for Respondents at 38, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S.
Ct. 3074 (1976).
74. Id.
manpower at the border, where far more illegal entrants are appre-
hended.7 5
Second, the decision to allocate manpower is an administrative
one which should be left to the executive and legislative branches.
By straining to justify, in terms of law enforcement need, the an-
nual seizure of millions of lawful motorists, the Court has played a
major role in an administrative decision which the facts and circum-
stances show to be unsound. Mr. Justice White described this prob-
lem succinctly in his concurring opinion in Brignoni-Ponce and Or-
tiz: 76
Perhaps the Judiciary should not strain to accommodate the re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment to the needs of a system
which at best can demonstrate only minimal effectiveness as long as
it is lawful for business firms and others to employ aliens who are
illegally in the country. This problems, which ordinarily law en-
forcement has not been able to solve, essentially poses questions of
national policy and is chiefly the business of Congress and the
Executive Branch rather than the courts. 7
Although the facts clearly indicate the effectiveness of alternative
alien-detection programs, the Court gave summary treatment to
consideration of the less-restrictive-means doctrine.78 The major-
ity's consideration of alternatives is contained entirely in footnote
12 of the opinion. The note contains several important revelations
which deserve separate discussion.
79
Footnote 12 begins by stating:
The defendants argue at length that the public interest in maintain-
ing checkpoints is less than is asserted by the Government because
the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced by means other
than checkpoint operations. As one alternative they suggest
legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of illegal aliens.
75. The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion. 514 F.2d at 318.
76. The concurring opinion applied to both cases.
77. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 915 (1975). By joining in the
majority opinion for Martinez-Fuerte, Mr. Justice White apparently ignored
his own cogent advice. This is particularly surprising in light of his state-
ment in Ortiz that "under the Court's opinions checkpoint investigative
stops, without search, will be difficult to justify under the Fourth Amend-
ment absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion." Id.
78. The other immigration law enforcement programs, which account for
the apprehension of more than 90 percent of all deportable aliens located,
include linewatch operations, public transportation inspections of buses,
trains, and aircraft, metropolitan patrols, industrial checking, farm and
ranch checking, and a boat patrol and stowaway inspection program. In
addition, many aliens are apprehended by other law enforcement agencies
and turned over to the Service. Brief for Respondents at 28, United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
79. One such revelation involves the burden of proof and is dealt with
in the text accompanying note 138 infra.
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The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments
could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all
search and seizure powers. 8
First, it is no more elaborate to argue such alternatives as imposing
sanctions on employers8 1 than it is to argue the necessity of check-
point operations given the demonstrated inefficiency of the latter.
Second, the Court ignored the fact that alternative law enforcement
programs currently employed account for well over 90 percent of
the apprehensions of undocumented aliens.82 The logic of the less-
restrictive-alternative arguments in the present context does not
bar the exercise of all search and seizure powers, but only of those
which unnecessarily sanction intrusive and arbitrary conduct. The
Court continued in the footnote:
In any event, these arguments tend to go to the general proposition
that all traffic-checking procedures are impermissible, a premise
our previous cases reject.8 3
Nowhere did respondents' brief argue that all traffic-checking pro-
cedures should be impermissible. Respondents cited as one reason-
able alternative the roving patrol car observations presently con-
ducted by Border Patrol officers in areas near the border.8 4 Re-
spondents also cited approvingly a traffic-checking procedure which
was utilized by the Border Patrol and which made use of the San
Clemente checkpoint as a base of operation to receive calls and con-
80. 96 S. Ct. at 3082 n.12.
81. Several bills designed to make unlawful or otherwise limit the em-
ployment of aliens have been considered in Congress during recent years,
but none has been enacted. The "Rodino Bill," H.R. 982, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973), was passed by the House of Representatives on May 3, 1973,
but never acted upon by the Senate. Brief for Respondents at 31 n.12,
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). For discussion of
the status of the various congressional bills penalizing the knowing employ-
ment of undocumented aliens, see Recent Developments in Immigration
Law 1976, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 301, 303-07 (1976).
It is also possible for individual states to enact comparable legislation.
See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1976). The United States
Supreme Court has recently upheld the California statute against a claim
of federal preemption. DeCanas v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933 (1976). For an anal-
ysis of the DeCanas decision, see Recent Development, Preemption in the
Field of Immigration: DeCanas v. Bica, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 282 (1976).
82. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
83. 96 S. Ct. at 3082 n.12.
84. Brief for Respondents at 28, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S.
Ct. 3074 (1976). These can lead to stops if facts warranting reasonable sus-
picion exist. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
duct reasonable suspicion stops.85 Respondents' position was not
that all traffic checking procedures are unconstitutional; rather,
they challenged only those allowing stops of vehicles in the absence
of any suspicion that undocumented aliens were within.
Impracticality of Imposing a Requirement of Reasonable
Suspicion
The Supreme Court stated:
A requirement that stops on major routes inland always be based
on reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of
traffic tends to be too heavy to allow particularized study of a
given car that would allow it to be identified as a possible carrier
of illegal aliens.88
In most instances a stationary officer would lack sufficient time to
observe articulable facts about a given vehicle as it approaches the
checkpoint. The same is not true in the cases of referrals to the sec-
ondary area. Once a vehicle is compelled to slow down and come
to a stop at the fingertips of the point officer, that officer and others
would ordinarily be able to observe articulable facts that might
warrant reasonable suspicion.8 7 Assuming arguendo the legality of
stopping all motorists, there is no reason referrals to the secondary
inspection area for interrogation should be allowed on less than rea-
sonable suspicion. The Court ignored this possibility of compromise
and held that further detention and questioning could be made on
a discretionary basis.8 8
The fundamental flaw in the impracticality argument is the no-
tion that the inconvenience of constitutional standards sanctions
their abuse. The logic of the argument could be employed to defeat
all constitutional restrictions on law enforcement practices. This
was made clear by the dissenting opinion:
There is no principle in the jurisprudence of fundamental rights
which permits constitutional limitations to be dispensed with mere-
ly because they cannot be conveniently satisfied. Dispensing with
reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to stopping and inspecting
motorists because the inconvenience of such a requirement would
make it impossible to identify a given car as a possible carrier of
85. Brief for Respondents at 39-40 n.22, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). Under this procedure, officers on roving patrol near
the checkpoint made calls to the checkpoint to ascertain whether vehicles
under their suspicion had been stopped previously. If an officer received
such information, which was kept on a rolodex, he would stop the car.
Id.
86. 96 S. Ct. at 3082.
87. Id. at 3090 (dissenting opinion).
88. Id. at 3085.
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aliens is no more justifiable than dispensing with probable cause as
prejequisite to the search of an individual because the inconveni-
ence of such a requirement would make it impossible to identify a
given person in a high-crime area as a possible carrier of concealed
weapons.8 9
The Minimal Degree of the Intrusion
The majority conceded that the routine checkpoint investigative
stops intruded on a motorist's rights to "free passage without inter-
ruption 90 and to personal security under the fourth amendment.9 1
However, the Court contended the intrusion was minimal and of a
nature different from that of the roving patrol stops which Brig-
noni-Ponce required to be based on reasonable suspicion.9 2 The
contention that investigative checkpoint stops are so less intrusive
than are roving patrol stops, and thus do not require reasonable sus-
picion, must be carefully examined.
The majority analyzed the effects of the intrusion in terms of an
objective-subjective distinction.93 Admitting that the objective as-
pects of routine checkpoint operations are identical to those of rov-
ing patrol investigations, the Court stated:
But we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the sub-
jective intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on the
part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the case of a check-
point stop.94
The Court continued by quoting from Ortiz:
Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and
their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the
motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see
visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to
be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.95
Trying to assess the nature of the official intrusion in terms of the
subjective impact on individuals is almost impossible. Who but that
individual can accurately assess the actual impact of the detention?
The Court can deal only in terms of supposition and probabilities
89. Id. at 3091.
90. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
91. 96 S. Ct. at 3082.
92. Id. at 3082-83.
93. Id. at 3083.
94. Id.
95. Id., quoting United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975).
when attempting to measure the subjective impact of law enforce-
ment conduct. The Court advanced no explanation about why mo-
torists who are brought to a stop in the middle of a highway by
flashing red lights, signs, and an armed Border Patrol officer would
be less frightened or annoyed than those who are signaled to pull
over by an officer in a patrol car. 6
Aside from the factual distinctions between roving patrols and
checkpoints and from suppositions about their different impact,9 7
the law enforcement activity is clearly identical in all significant as-
pects and suffers from the same constitutional infirmities. In both
instances motorists and their passengers may be subject to interfer-
ence with their passage in the form of detention and interrogation. 8
The difference is not in the nature of the intrusions but only in the
surrounding factual context in which they are carried out. Given
the teaching of Brignoni-Ponce that such conduct when pursued on
a causeless basis is unreasonable,99 it is too late to argue the mini-
mal intrusiveness of the law enforcement activity. Because law en-
forcement conduct is the subject of the fourth amendment's pro-
scription of unreasonable searches and seizures, that conduct should
control the outcome of all cases involving highway searches and
seizures.
Interference with Lawful Traffic
As in Brignoni-Ponce,100 the Supreme Court considered the "over-
all degree of interference with legitimate traffic."10 1 While noting
96. That checkpoints display visible signs of authority probably does not
lessen the impact of the intrusion. Motorists who are stopped by roving
patrols are given notice of the officers' authority by the appearance of the
car, flashing signal light, and the uniformed attire of the officers. The dif-
ference in the display of authority by roving patrols and the San Clemente
checkpoint is largely quantitative-at the latter there are more officers,
more flashing red lights, and usually several patrol cars within sight. Such
a showing of authority may be more frightening or annoying to motorists
who are stopped.
97. As the dissenting opinion noted, even if some significant differences
in the subjective aspects of checkpoint stops did exist, a need remains for
"some principled restraint on law enforcement conduct." 96 S. Ct. at 3089
(dissenting opinion).
98. The majority was certainly aware of the similarity between check-
point investigative stops and roving stops. In describing the intrusion
caused by routine checkpoint stops, the Court quoted a passage from
Brignoni-Ponce describing roving patrol detentions. Id. at 3082-83, quoting
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975).
99. 422 U.S. at 882.
100. Id. at 882-83.
101. 96 S. Ct. at 3083.
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that random roving patrol stops subjected border area residents to
"potentially unlimited interference with the use of the high-
ways,"'102 the majority asserted that with respect to causeless check-
point stops "the potential interference with legitimate traffic is
minimal."'1 3 The reasons offered were the motorists' knowledge of
the location of the checkpoints and the activity of Border Patrol of-
ficers. The latter was said to be less discretionary and less abusive
than that occasioned by roving stops.10-
The two reasons advanced are not persuasive. That motorists
know or can obtain knowledge of a checkpoint's location does not
minimize its interference with their travel. If they desire to exer-
cise their constitutional right to uninterrupted travel, 0 5 they will
be stopped and possibly detained for questioning and further in-
spection. The second contention, that there is less room for discre-
tionary and abusive activity at checkpoints, even if true, 0 6 is not
germane to a discussion of the overall interference with legitimate
traffic. Lawful motorists are nonetheless subjected to a causeless
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Manifestly the overall degree of interference with lawful motorist
traffic is significantly greater in the case of checkpoint stops than
in that of roving stops. Routine checkpoint procedures entail a
stopping of all vehicles passing through, while roving patrol stops
impede only those who are pursued and pulled over. In addition,
the location of the checkpoints guarantees that most of the vehicles
stopped will not contain undocumented aliens. Roving patrol oper-
ations take place mainly in the immediate border area, whereas
most checkpoints are positioned away from the border in the inte-
rior. Thus, all motorists commuting on the highways may be
stopped, even though only a small percentage are transporting un-
documented aliens. This mass interference is particularly aggra-
vated at San Clemente, where the checkpoint interrupts the traffic
flow of the major artery between California's two largest cities, San




105. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). Cf. Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
35 (1868).
106. See text accompanying notes 125-30 infrTa.
107. The Ninth Circuit stated: "We cannot countenance the cumulative
The Potential for Discretionary and Abusive Police Conduct
The Martinez-Fuerte majority said:
[C]heckpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less
discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in
which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, re-
assuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly autho-
rized and believed to serve the public interest.10s
It is not clear how the "regularized manner" in which checkpoint
procedures are conducted affects discretionary activity. All vehi-
cles passing through the checkpoint must come to a stop, and the
point officer has complete discretion to choose which ones are to be
referred to the secondary inspection area.10 9 It is difficult to see
how this subjective choice of individuals for further detention,
which need not be based on any quantum of suspicion, can be lim-
ited by the routine manner in which vehicles are stopped. Under
the Supreme Court's holding, no controls are imposed on or stand-
ards govern the selective referral by Border Patrol officers. The
law enforcement conduct at issue thus remains completely discre-
tionary in the full sense of the term."i0
The majority also stated:
[S]ince field officers may stop only those cars passing the check-
point, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individu-
als than there was in the case of roving patrol stops."'
Officers on roving patrol perhaps have a better opportunity for abu-
sive practices than do those at checkpoints where there are probably
other officers, motorists, and better lighting. However, the fact
cannot be ignored that certain features of checkpoint stations might
intrusion of stopping ten million cars per year where only one out of every
1000 passing cars may contain aliens illegally within -the country." United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d at 322.
108. 96 S. Ct. at 3083.
109. At most checkpoints other than San Clemente, the point officer con-
ducts the inquiry himself, but retains discretion to refer vehicles to a sec-
ondary area for further questioning. Brief for Petitioner at 52 n.19, United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
110. The majority made the remarkable comment that "selective referrals
-rather than questioning the occupants of every car-tend to advance some
Fourth Amendment interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general
motoring public." 96 S. Ct. at 3084. As the dissenting opinion noted, such
an assertion stands the fourth amendment on its head as it begins from
the starting point that causeless, random intrusions are generally permis-
sible, and any lessening of the intrusions therefore "advances" fourth
amendment interests. Id. at 3089 n.2 (dissenting opinion). The majority's
view is consistent with its perverse treatment of fourth amendment interests
throughout the opinion.
111. Id. at 3083.
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conceivably be used to increase the potential for abuse. 1 2 In any
event, the possibility of abusive law enforcement activities should
not be given undue significance." 3 The reasonableness inquiry is
focused not on the extremities of police misconduct but rather on
the routine operations defended by the Government. Their consti-
tutionality depends on the intrusive nature of the stop, detention,
and interrogation which they entail and which should have con-
trolled the outcome of the case.
No Quantum of Suspicion for Checkpoint Seizures is Required
The Supreme Court noted that "some quantum of individualized
suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or
seizure," but also stated "the Fourth Amendment imposes no irre-
ducible requirement of such suspicion." 1 4 As authority the Court
cited Camara v. Municipal Court,"5 in which administrative build-
ing inspections were allowed absent a suspicion that a particular
structure violated a local housing code.
The holding in Camara is no authority for condoning official in-
vestigatory conduct absent any degree of particularized cause or
suspicion. Camara permitted building inspections which are "nei-
ther personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of
crime."" 6 More importantly, the Camara inspections may occur
only after issuance of a judicial warrant based on some quantum of
cause to believe a particular building might violate the housing
code. As the Court stated:
[I]t is obvious that "probable cause" to issue a warrant to inspect
must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a par-
ticular dwelling.117
The holding in Camara taught the wisdom and practicality of a
compromise between traditional fourth amendment requirements
112. The presence of more officers and the existence of a building or
other structure where an individual may be hidden from public view might
operate to further oppressive law enforcement practices.
113. The author assumes hopefully that the incidence of repressive Bor-
der Patrol practices is negligible.
114. 96 S. Ct. at 3084.
115. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
116. Id. at 537.
117. Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
and public law enforcement interests-not subjugation of the for-
mer to the latter. Thus although traditional probable cause was not
required, some lesser quantum of proof was. Though suspicion
about the specific nature of the violations was not required, the
Court did require suspicion of violations in a specific building.118 In
sum, Camara was written neither to countenance absolute abandon-
ment of cause or suspicion nor to condone the arbitrary investiga-
tive conduct involved in Martinez-Fuerte. No judicial authority ex-
ists to support the random "dragnet-like procedure"'1 9 occasioned
by checkpoint operations.1
20
An additional reason advanced for abandoning the requirement of
any articulable suspicion was the lesser fourth amendment interests
individuals have in the operation of their vehicles. The Court noted
it was dealing
neither with searches nor with the sanctity of private dwellings, or-
dinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protec-
tion .... As we have noted earlier, one's expectation of privacy
in an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly
different from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom
in one's residence.' 21
Apparently, deemphasis of the valid fourth amendment interests
enjoyed by motorists made their eventual abrogation easier. How-
118. The Court stated as examples the nature of the building, the passage
of time, and the condition of the area as a whole. Id.
119. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. at 3089 (dissenting opin-
ion).
120. As additional authority for the abandonment of individualized sus-
picion, the Court cited Almeida Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. at 283-
85 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 288 (White, J., dissenting); United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154
(1925). 96 S. Ct. at 3084. Reference to Biswell and Colonnade, cases which
involved administrative inspections of firearm and liquor dealers, is mis-
placed. The Supreme Court pointed out in Almeida-Sanchez: "A central
difference between those cases and this one is that businessmen engaged
in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as
well as the benefits of their trade .... The businessman in a regulated
industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him." 413 U.S.
at 271.
The Court's citation of Carroll was in reference to the oft-quoted language
which authorizes the stopping of all travelers at the international boundary
for purposes of "national selfprotection." 267 U.S. at 154. The language
immediately preceding this passage in Carroll is much more on point to
the issue of random inland stops: "It would be intolerable and unreason-
able if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the
chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the
highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search." Id. at 153-
54.
121. 96 S. Ct. at 3084 (citations omitted).
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ever, the differences between a person's privacy interest in his home
and interest in the ownership and operation of his automobile
should not affect protection of the latter. The Supreme Court had
previously stated that:
This inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the
citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in
his study to dispose of his secret affairs.' 22
Further, as the Court recognized in Carroll v. United States,123
motorists have a constitutional interest which the private home
dweller does not-the right to free passage on the highway without
interruption. 12 4 The interests in privacy and freedom enjoyed by
travelers on the highway are both important and constitutionally
protected. That they are qualitatively distinguishable from the in-
terests a person has in his home should have played no part in the
Court's decision.
Checkpoint Stops Need not be Authorized by a Warrant
By allowing investigatory seizures without any showing of cause
or suspicion, the Supreme Court rendered inapplicable the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment.1 25  This requirement had
previously been explained by the Court:
The point of the Fourth Amendment ... is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate in-
stead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competi-
tive enterprise of ferreting out crime.' 26
Under the Court's holding, Border Patrol officers need not assess
any evidence or draw any inferences, because no cause for their ac-
tions is necessary. The magistrate, who traditionally makes his own
determination of cause or suspicion, thus has no role in the deci-
sion.
1 2 7
122. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968). See also Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
123. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
124. Id. at 153-54.., The Court had previously stated that the fourth
amendment "protects individual privacy against certain kinds of govern-
mental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to
do with privacy at all." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at,350.
125. 96 S. Ct. at 3086.
126. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
127. Viewed as an exception to the warrant requirement, checkpoint
One proposition the majority offered in rationalizing its bypass of
the warrant requirement deserves comment. The Court stated that
the discretionary activity of the patrol officers was lessened by the
decision of higher ranking officials concerning the location of the
checkpoints. 128 Noting the purpose of the warrant requirement to
substitute a magistrate's judgment for that of the field officer's, the
majority asserted:
But the need for this is reduced when the decision to "seize" is not
entirely in the hands of the officer in the field, and deference is to
be given to the administrative decisions of higher ranking offi-
cials.129
Although higher-ranking officials might determine the location of
the checkpoints, the Court conceded that "Border Patrol officers
must have wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted
for the brief questioning involved."'180 The precise location of a
checkpoint bears little relation to the issue of unhampered discre-
tion. All major and most minor roads leading into the interior will
be blocked by traffic checkpoints at some spot. It is probably small
comfort to lawful motorists who are stopped and possibly detained
further to know that the place of their detention could have been
a few miles away and that it was chosen by a higher-ranking offi-
cial.
There is an even more fundamental defect in the Court's reason-
ing. The warrant procedure does not contemplate a distinction
within the executive branch between field officers and administra-
tive officials, but instead between the executive on the one hand
and the judiciary on the other.' 13 The perversion of such a rudi-
mentary principle evidences the extent of the Court's disregard for
fourth amendment rights.
Selective Referrals Made upon the Basis of Race are Permissible
In a broadly-sweeping passage the Martinez-Fuerte Court stated:
We further believe that it is constitutional to refer motorists se-
stops appear to be the most broadly based in terms of investigative scope
and the least justified in terms of exigent circumstances.
128. 96 S. Ct. at 3083.
129. Id. at 3086.
130. Id. at 3085.
131. In United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317
(1972), the Court stated: "The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate
the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magis-
trates .... [T]hose charged with this investigative and prosecutorial duty
should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive
means in pursuing their tasks."
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lectively to the secondary inspection area at the San Clemente
checkpoint on the basis of criteria that would not sustain a roving
patrol stop. Thus, even if it be assumed that such referrals are
made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, we per-
ceive no constitutional violation.
13 2
There can be no doubt that Latin Americans who reside lawfully
within the country and whose appearance reflects their ancestry
will bear the brunt of the decision. 133 The Court has given Border
Patrol officers carte blanche to make selective interrogations based
upon nothing more than the apparent ethnicity of the detainee. The
potential for abuse is enormous in light of the large number of
Latin Americans residing lawfully in the southwest, particularly in
southern California.-3 4 In United States v. Mallides, the Ninth Cir-
cuit took judicial notice that
there is a large Mexican-American population in the Oceanside[
135]
area .... [I] t is impossible to determine from looking at a person
of Mexican descent whether he is an American citizen, a Mexican
national with proper entry papers, or a Mexican alien without pa-
pers.136
In another case the Ninth Circuit noted that Los Angeles has the
largest Mexican population of any city on the continent, with the
exception of Mexico City.
137
In addition to condoning the type of arbitrary law enforcement
conduct precluded by the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court
approved enforcement procedures which may deprive Latin Ameri-
cans of the right to equal protection.'3" Although discriminatory
action based on the criterion of race traditionally invokes close judi-
cial scrutiny,'3 9 the Court's summary treatment of this issue indi-
132. 96 S. Ct. at 3085.
133. Id. at 3089-901 (dissenting opinion).
134. The Court cited 1970 census figures showing that 16 percent of Cali-
fornia's population, over three million people, were Spanish speaking or
Spanish surnamed. Id. at 3085 n.16. Approximately 52 percent of the in-
habitants of the Imperial Valley, located in southern California, are Mexi-
can-American. Brief for Respondents at 42, United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
135. Oceanside is eighteen miles south of San Clemente.
136. 473 F.2d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 1973).
137. Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir. 1963).
138. While the fourteenth amendment provides that no state may deprive
a person of equal protection of the laws, the due process clause of the fifth
amendment should impose the same restriction on federal authorities. See
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-50D (1954).
139. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1969); McLaughlin v.
cates that it did not seriously consider the consequences of mass en-
croachments on the right to equal protection under the laws.
140
Allocation of the Burden of Proof
The Government's success with its unsubstantiated claim of law
enforcement need may have resulted from the majority's tampering
with the traditional burden of proof regarding warrantless law en-
forcement activities. Although the Court made no specific mention
of who had the burden of proof, the final sentence of footnote 12 is
revealing:
The defendants do not suggest persuasively that the particular law
enforcement needs served by checkpoints could be met without re-
liance on routine checkpoint stops.141
The statement is noteworthy enough for its lack of factual sup-
port. 42 More importantly, however, it seems to imply the Court's
willingness to impose on the detainee the burden of proving that
law enforcement needs could be better served through other means,
Such an allocation of the burden of proof would indeed be novel
doctrine. The Court's suggestion that respondents did not show
persuasively that law enforcement needs could be met without the
use of warrantless, causeless programs runs counter to the long-
standing principle that the Government must prove the need for an
exception to the warrant requirement. 143 Respondents established
to the satisfaction of the Court that the law enforcement conduct at
issue constituted a seizure under the fourth amendment and that
their rights to privacy and personal security had been impinged.
They also established the seizures had been based on standardless,
random law enforcement practices. Given these considerations, the
Government should have been compelled to prove the need for con-
ducting such operations.
CONCLUSION
The Martinez-Fuerte decision is troublesome in five significant as-
pects. The first two relate to the procedure the Supreme Court uti-
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
140. See Brief for Respondents at 42-44, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
141. 96 S. Ct. at 3082 n.12 (emphasis added).
142. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
143. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762 (1969); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); Mac-
Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
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lized in reaching its decision; the remainder involve substantive
fourth amendment doctrine.
The most significant procedural point is the demonstrated ineffi-
ciency of the Court as a fact-finding body when it is faced with com-
plex and contradictory statistics. Drawing empirical conclusions
about the need and effectiveness of traffic-checking operations in
the present context of rampant unlawful immigration is a difficult
task. The Court's failure to adequately perform this task was an in-
evitable result of its decision to cite only those statistics which ap-
peared to support its conclusion. In addition, the Court cast a con-
fusing shadow over established evidentiary procedure by trifling
with the allocation of the burden of proof with respect to the consti-
tutionality of warrantless law enforcement practices.
Substantively, the Supreme Court has sacrificed the principles of
the fourth amendment for the expediency of an operation which un-
justifiably burdens millions of law-abiding motorists annually, em-
ploys discretionary and standardless official detention and interro-
gation, and which is of nominal value when viewed in the context
of reasonable and less restrictive alternatives. Further, the Court
rejected the clear doctrinal background established by Almeida-
Sanchez, Brignoni-Ponce, and Ortiz, fashioning an opinion in-
consistent with those precedents. Finally, Martinez-Fuerte pro-
vides a dangerous potential for massive discrimination against a
large ethnic minority group residing lawfully in the country. The
sanctioning of selective referrals to secondary inspection areas on
nothing more than an individual's ethnic appearance is perhaps the
most frightening result of Martinez-Fuerte. It is hoped that one
day this final aspect will be a catalyst for an overruling of Marti-
nez-Fuerte by a more enlightened Supreme Court.
VICTOR SALERNO
